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On the morning of his thirtieth birthday, Josef K., a member of the Council of the
Anti-corruption Agency of Montenegro, was dismissed of his duties, by the very
same body that appointed him: the Parliament of Montenegro. This could be the
first sentence of a novel written by Franz Kafka if he was with us today. While
Kafka’s Josef K. was arrested and left to roam free through a court building to find
a courtroom in which his destiny would be determined, Josef K. in this story is in a
similarly peculiar situation: He does not know which court in Montenegro he should
appeal to and present his grievances. This Kafkaesque reality is the result of a
questionable interpretation of the law by Montenegro’s Supreme Court – just another
piece in the demise of the country’s rule of law.
In the course of one year, the Parliament of Montenegro managed to dismiss Vanja
#alovi# (member of the Council of the Anti-corruption Agency of Montenegro),
Goran #urovi# (member of the Council of the National Broadcasting Company of
Montenegro), Irena Radovi# (Vice Governor of Central Bank of Montenegro) and
Nikola Vuk#evi# (member of the Council of the National Broadcasting Company of
Montenegro) of their duties. All these people now find themselves in the situation of
our protagonist, Josef K.
One might probably wonder: Wouldn’t it be natural that an Administrative Court
of sorts would have jurisdiction since our protagonist was appointed in an
administrative procedure, by one of the three main branches of government?
According to Article 82(1(14)) of the Constitution, the Parliament of Montenegro has
the authority to appoint and dismiss from duty members of various governmental
bodies, including members in the councils overseeing those bodies. In its recently
published legal position of principle, the Supreme Court of Montenegro announced
that regular administrative courts do not have jurisdiction over such matters.
The Supreme Court does not explicitly rule whether such cases fall within the
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court, but the Supreme Court President in her public
appearance indicated that this is a matter of constitutional law.
The Constitutional Court, however, has already dismissed one of three cases with
an identical or similar background that are being heard before regular courts in
Montenegro. It held that the Constitutional Court is only competent to hear such
cases when all legal remedies have been exhausted, thus the applicant must wait
for the outcome before the regular courts (U-III 225/18). In addition, the President
of the Constitutional Court, Dragoljub Draškovi#, published a paper, in which he
explicitly stated that disputes with regards to personal appointments and dismissals
by the Parliament do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. This
is rightfully so, as Article 149 (7) of the Constitution only refers to electoral disputes
and disputes related to referendums. Here, I must clarify that in the Serbo-Croatian
language family, the noun used for ‘election’ and ‘appointment’ is the same: “izbor”.
However, from a reading of this paragraph, it is clear that it refers to the domain of
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elections and it is peculiar how so many judges in the Supreme Court appear to have
missed this.
An unsolicited opinion
A legal position of principle is, in general, non-binding on lower courts. However,
according to Montenegrin legal jurisprudence, if a judge of a lower court refuses
to apply it or opposes its application, the judge must support such difference with
valid argumentation and justification, otherwise there is a grave risk of the judgment
being revoked. The aim of adopting legal positions of principle and legal opinions of
principle in Montenegrin jurisprudence is to harmonize courts’ practice. This practice
thus helps to secure the rule of law by providing legal certainty and clarity as well as
equality before the law and does not only refer to the jurisdiction of Supreme Court.
Delivering such legal positions of principles in order to define legal principles and
standards on both vertical and horizontal levels throughout the judicial system is one
of the Supreme Court’s core purposes beyond its adjudicating role. In doing so, it
relies not only on the constitution and laws, but also on international standards and
international law and jurisprudence. According to Articles 25 and 26 of the Law on
Courts, a legal position of principle is usually delivered on the Supreme Court’s own
initiative or upon the request of the lower courts in times when disparate practice of
lower courts in similar cases is obvious.
So how did we come to this impasse? I will refrain from elaborating on this
idiosyncratic situation, in which, contrary to the Constitution, the President of the
Supreme Court received her third mandate. It is peculiar that this legal position of
principle was adopted in the midst of four cases of unlawful dismissals of people
appointed in various institutions. These cases have also gained media attention, as
well as favorable judgments before regular courts, which shows that there were no
disparate practices occurring.
The reason for harmonization came from the interpretation of the Law on
Administrative Procedures, which in its Article 13 states that the Administrative Court
does not have jurisdiction in matters where jurisdiction is conferred to other courts,
or in matters related to the decisions of Parliament or the President of Montenegro.
Article 14 of the Law on Courts defines the jurisdiction of basic courts and states that
basic courts always have jurisdiction to adjudicate in first instance on other matters,
unless the law prescribes the jurisdiction of another court. Thus, the Supreme
Court’s opinion is an outcome of a literal interpretation of these provisions. Instead,
a systematic and teleological interpretation would have taken into consideration
the purpose of administrative procedures, which is to secure judicial control over
administrative state bodies and governments. The Administrative Court adjudicates
on the legality and lawfulness of administrative acts, and not of any human rights
violation without examining any potential fundamental or human rights violations.
Ergo, the Constitutional Court is not the primary address for such disputes.
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Denying the right to have rights
In this manner, the highest-ranking judges in Montenegro have contributed to the
creation of pseudo-legal justice, where legal norms appear as imperative, come what
may. Our hero, Josef K., is in a judicial penumbra created by the legal system, in
which his basic right to access the courts as well as principles of equality before
the law are violated. Where any other government employee can seek for justice
before the regular courts in Montenegro, those appointed by the Parliament may
only do so before the Constitutional Court, under the premise that human rights
violations have occurred. The right to access courts and equality before the law are
cut from the same cloth which means that the former encompasses not only criminal
or civil proceedings, but all proceedings in which a party suffered some harmful
consequences. The Supreme Court is not fulfilling its role that is immanent to the
judicial branch in any democratic society: to define the division of powers and adjust
a system of checks and balances between branches of government (Parliament vs.
Government). By doing so, it allows the state to not respect the rights that are owed
to persons and thus it fails to protect citizens from unfair treatment attributable to
governmental actions.
According to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), vis-à-vis the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), a right to access courts also includes a right
to be able to place one’s case effectively before a court (see para. 24 in Airey v.
Ireland, 6289/73). ECtHR jurisprudence confirms that disputes concerning public
servants fall within the scope of Article 6 of the ECHR, and this includes all disputes,
notwithstanding the special nature of the relationship between the particular civil
servant and the State in question. I quote this in case someone would argue
that being appointed by Parliaments creates certain special bonds between the
appointee and the government. It does not. (see para. 50-62 in Vilho Eskelinen and
Others v. Finland, 63235/00)
At the same time, the ECtHR has developed a two-prong test (Vilho Eskelinen test)
according to which it will be “for the respondent Government to demonstrate, firstly,
that a civil-servant applicant does not have a right of access to a court under national
law and, secondly, that the exclusion of the rights under Article 6 for the civil servant
is justified” (para. 62). Thus, the legal position of principle in question is inconsistent
with the Constitution, as well as with the ECHR and ECtHR jurisprudence because
it prevents Josef K.’s access to justice. By denying the regular courts’ jurisdiction to
adjudicate in administrative matters, the Supreme Court implicates itself in allowing
unlawful decisions to be made, having a cascading effect that contributes to the
demise of the rule of law.
I dare to pose one last and final observation. According to Hannah Arendt, every
individual possesses sovereignty in a democratic state, and since all individuals
should be equal they share that sovereignty to prevent one group from dominating
another. In such circumstances, she emphasizes the particularity of the human being
as a member of a political community, which is a right in itself. Ultimately, Arendt
claims that above and before everything, we have a right to have rights. Linguistically
observed, a right (ius, droit, diritto) indicates the idea of some positive law where
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a law (lex, loi, legge) is seen as a broad, institutionally established norm. Now I
wonder, if the Supreme Court judges, by interpreting certain laws and consequently
negating certain rights, truly believe that they provide for the harmonization of
practices and a respect for the rule of law. I only recognize that ultimately, the Josef
Ks of Montenegro have been denied their fundamental rights, oppressed upon by a
judiciary that is supposed to uphold equal protection under the law.
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